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data sets from two government surveys to investigate how the minimum wage has affected 
the wage distribution under unusual circumstances of deflation. The compression of the lower 
tail of the female wage distribution is largely explained by an increased real value of the 
minimum wage. Steady increases in the effective minimum wage reduced employment 
among low-skilled, middle-aged female workers, but the mechanical effect associated with 
disemployment on wage compression was minimal. 
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Wage distributions have evolved differently among advanced industrialized countries, although these
countries have shared similar experiences of rapid technological progress and increased exposure to
international trade and outsourcing. In particular, the Japanese wage distribution has remained stable
relative to those of Anglo-Saxon countries. The 90/50 and 10/50 log-wage differentials exhibit no
particular trend for male workers from 1994 to 2003 (Figure 1, Panel A), which may be at odds with a
recent polarization in the U.K. and U.S. labor markets, in which employment in high-skilled and low-
skilled jobs has expanded at the expense of medium-skilled jobs (Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor,
Katz, Kearney, 2008). Nonetheless, both the 10th and 90th percentile wages have increased compared
to the 50th percentile wage for female workers (Figure 1, Panel B). This trend implies dispersion at
the upper tail and compression at the lower tail of the female wage distribution.
While compression occurred at the lower tail of the female wage distribution, the nominal min-
imum wage has steadily increased for institutional reasons, despite economic downturns (Figure 2).
The median wage has fallen nominally since 1999 because of a severe recession. During price and
wage de￿ation, the rise in the minimum wage was higher in real terms than in nominal terms. Be-
cause revisions of the statutory minimum wage tend to lag behind general price in￿ation or de￿ation,
the real value of the minimum wage shifts toward the lower end of the wage distribution during a
period of in￿ation, whereas the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage is greater during a period of de￿ation. In
fact, the real minimum wage increased by a weighted average of 0.16 log points across 47 prefectures
between 1994 and 2003.
Our hypothesis is that an increase in the real value of the minimum wage contributed to the
compression of the wage distribution among low-skilled workers. There is mixed evidence on the
importance of the minimum wage among labor-market institutions as a determinant of the evolution
of the wage distribution. In the United States, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) demonstrated
that erosion of the real minimum-wage level during the 1980s contributed to wage dispersion. Lee
(1999) found that erosion of the real value of the minimum wage caused by general price in￿ation
almost completely explained wage dispersion over the corresponding period. Autor, Manning, and
Smith (2008) con￿rmed that the minimum wage plays a certain role in compressing the lower tail of
1the wage distribution after correcting for upward bias in Lee’s (1999) results, using an instrumental
variable approach. Studies conducted in the United Kingdom have reported that the introduction of
the British national minimum wage in 1999 did not contribute much to wage compression, because
the minimum wage was low relative to the average wage and the fraction of workers affected by
the minimum wage was small (Dickens and Manning, 2004a, 2004b). Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Sch￿nberg (2008) attributed the recent increase in the gap between the 15th and 50th percentile wages
in Germany to a decline in the union coverage rate. German minimum wages have been set by
collective labor agreements between labor unions and ￿rms, although no statutory minimum wage
exists in Germany. Under such an institutional setting, deunionization leads to an erosion of minimum
wages. Some relevant evidence has also been found in Japan. Abe and Tanaka (2007) pointed out that
the prefectural minimum wage contributed to a reduction in the wage gap between full- and part-time
workers in rural areas. Abe and Tamada (2007) found that an increase in the minimum wage was
associated with an increase in the wage level among part-time workers. These studies examined only
the effect on the mean wage, however. Hori and Sakaguchi (2005) illustrated the wage distribution
in 2003 by prefecture and industry separately for full- and part-time workers, but did not conduct a
formal regression analysis for the relation between minimum wage and wage distribution.1
This study examines the evolution of the Japanese wage distribution under conditions of wage
de￿ation, with a central focus on the compression in lower-tail inequality for female workers. We
analyze an econometric model that explains standard measures of wage inequality in terms of the
effective minimum wage. The ‘effective’ minimum wage can be measured by the distance between
minimum wage and median wage in the distribution of log hourly wage. Our identi￿cation strategy
is basically to exploit regional variation in the effective minimum wage over time, which is known
as a difference-in-differences (or ￿xed-effects) approach. Because the statutory minimum wage and
the nature of the wage distribution evolve differently across prefectures, the minimum wage effect
on the wage distribution can be isolated from unobserved prefectural heterogeneity and common
macroeconomic ￿uctuations. Our empirical model includes prefecture-speci￿c linear time trends, as
well as prefecture and time effects, to allow for possible changes in the dispersion of the latent wage
1A spike around the minimum-wage level is somewhat obscure in their illustration for a couple of reasons. First, the
sample was split into small subgroups. Second, the bin width chosen was so narrow that the distribution was ragged
everywhere.
2distribution. Instrumental variable methods are used to assess robustness against measurement errors
and policy endogeneity. The kernel reweighting approach proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996) is also employed to examine the alternative hypothesis that changes in workforce composition
mechanically lowered lower-tail inequality. Using the regression coef￿cients, the counterfactual wage
distribution without an increase in the effective minimum wage is created to quantify the contribution
of the increased real minimum-wage level on the evolution of the wage distribution between 1994 and
2003.
Wage compression can occur via three channels: censoring, spillover, and truncation. Lee (1999)
revealed the presence of a spillover effect, but his approach cannot exactly differentiate among the
three effects. Autor, Manning, and Smith (2008) decomposed the total effect into censoring and
spillover effects in the absence of the truncation effect. Their approach assumes that the latent wage
distribution has a lognormal distribution in the absence of minimum wages and that introducing a
minimum wage has no adverse effect on employment. If the minimum wage has a disemployment
effect, however, as documented by Neumark and Wascher (2008), a possible truncation of the wage
distribution because of the minimum-wage increase can mechanically reduce lower-tail inequality. In
this study, we develop two methods to examine to what extent truncation can explain wage compres-
sion. Our ￿rst approach is a variant of the inverse probability method (Little and Rubin, 2002). The
proposed methods do not require a distributional assumption about the latent wage distribution.
Our analysis reveals that an increase in the minimum wage signi￿cantly pushed up wages for
low-skilled female workers. Compression of the lower tail of the female wage distribution is largely
explained by the minimum wage’s increased real value. The actual 10/50 log-wage differential stayed
constant at around 0.51 between 1994 and 2003 for female workers, but would have diverged by
about 0.05 log points if there had been no increase in the effective minimum wage. Composition
effects might be the main driving force for widening female upper-tail inequality but not for reducing
female low-tail wage inequality. Moreover, we ￿nd that the minimum-wage hike contributed to a
reduction in the pay gap between full- and part-time workers by about 0.05 log points at the lower
end of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the compression of the wage distribution’s lower tail is
not attributable to the mechanical effect associated with truncation of the wage distribution, although
3a moderate adverse effect of minimum wage on employment is observed among middle-aged female
workers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the minimum-wage sys-
tem in Japan. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis. Section 4 examines how the minimum
wage affected the lower tail of the wage distribution separately for male and female workers. We
quantify the effect by comparing the actual wage distribution to the counterfactual wage distribution
without an increase in the effective minimum wage. Section 5 reexamines the relation between min-
imum wage and wage compression, using a counterfactual sample in the absence of disemployment.
The last section presents our conclusions.
2 Statutory Minimum Wage in Japan
The Minimum Wages Law in Japan was enacted in 1959 and substantially revised in 1967. The
current law de￿nes two types of minimum wages: (1) regional minimum wages based on collective
agreement and (2) prefectural and industrial minimum wages based on the research and deliberations
of minimum-wage councils. The ￿rst type of minimum wages is premised on craft-wide or industry-
wide bargaining by which minimum wages are agreed upon and extended to nonunionized workers
within the same sector. Such bargaining, however, does not really exist under the Japanese enterprise
union system; in practice, all minimum wages in Japan are currently of the second type.2 The second
type of minimum wages comprises prefectural minimum wages covering all workers and industrial
minimum wages covering workers aged 18 to 65 in speci￿c industries in particular prefectures. This
study focuses on prefectural minimum wages because industrial minimum wages cover a small frac-
tion of workers.3
Under the current system, prefectural minimum wages are revised every year in two steps. First,
the central minimum-wage council classi￿es all 47 Japanese prefectures into four ranks by actual
wage levels and the standard cost of living and suggests how much the minimum wage should be
2Moreover, the ￿rst type was formally abolished in 2008.
3The report by Saitei Chingin no Arikata Kenkyukai (minimum wage study group) of the Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare recommended revising the industrial minimum wage in 2005, including possibly abolishing it. In ￿scal year
2000, 4.5 million workers were covered by the industry minimum wage, while 52 million workers were covered by the
regional minimum wage, according to a press release of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare on January 25 in 2001.
4increased (￿meyasu￿) for each rank. The central minimum-wage council is not an ad-hoc but a stand-
ing institution administered by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The council consists of
representatives of public interest (academics and retired bureaucrats), employers, and employees, and
its decisions have been insusceptible to politics. The minimum-wage policy has not been coordinated
with any other policy, such as unemployment insurance and a measure to promote small and medium
enterprises, which is different from minimum-wage systems in other countries. Second, the chief of
the prefectural labor bureau determines the level of the prefectural minimum wage based on the re-
gional minimum-wage councils’ deliberations. The regional minimum-wage councils’ deliberations
are strongly in￿uenced by the central minimum-wage council’s suggestions for the increased amount
of minimum wage.
The meyasu system was introduced in 1978 to moderate regional disparities in minimum wages.
The classi￿cation of 47 prefectures into four ranks has hardly ever changed, however. Prefectural
minimum wages have not been revised in a way that re￿ects local labor-market conditions for any
particular prefecture. Prefectural minimum wages vary within the same rank because of the difference
in the minimum-wage level before the meyasu system was introduced.4 The current system in which
the central minimum-wage council suggests the minimum-wage increase every year induced inertia.
In fact, the real value of minimum wage increased by 50% between 1975 and 1995 (OECD, 1998,
Chart 2.1). This trend continued even during a recession.
The minimum wage is legally enforceable in the following manner. The prefectural labor stan-
dards inspection of￿ce is in charge of enforcement. When an employer’s noncompliance is detected,
the labor bureau may institute a ￿ne of up to 20,000 yen (about 200 U.S. dollars). Employers who
violate the minimum-wage law must also compensate employees for the difference between the min-
imum wage and the actual wage. Moreover, the minimum wage seems to be enforced largely through
public pressure on employers. In particular, the reputations of larger companies would be damaged if
the public were aware that they paid workers less than the minimum wage.
4The current minimum-wage level is approximately the same as the 1977 level plus the accumulated total of annual
minimum-wage increases since 1978.
53 Data
Our analysis uses 1994￿2003 micro data from the Basic Survey of Wage Structure (BSWS), which
is compiled annually by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The survey covers private es-
tablishments with 5 or more regular employees and public establishments with 10 or more regular
employees in almost all regions and industries in Japan, with the exception of agriculture. Approxi-
mately 1.5 million workers have been surveyed every year from 60,000￿70,000 establishments. Es-
tablishments are randomly sampled in proportion to prefecture and industry size and the number of
employees according to the Establishment and Enterprise Census, which lists all establishments in
Japan. For the survey, randomly selected establishments are asked to extract employee information
from payroll records,5 and establishments and individual ￿les are then merged using an establishment
identi￿cation number. Both full- and part-time workers are included in the sample when they are
directly hired by employers and accordingly appear on the establishment’s payroll record. The avail-
able information includes each worker’s wages, age, sex, educational attainment (only for full-time
workers), full-/part-time status, type of work or job, and working days/hours, as well as the ￿rm’s at-
tributes, such as the number of regular workers (joyo rodo sha),6 the number of new graduates hired,
￿rm size, industry, and location.
Data about wages and hours include individuals’ contracted pay, overtime pay, allowances (e.g.,
for family and transportation), contracted hours of work, and overtime hours between June 1 and
June 30 over the corresponding period. Because the effective date of change in prefectural minimum
wages is either September 30 or October 1 of each year, we merge statutory minimum-wage data in
year t￿1 with wage and hour data from the BSWS in year t. Japanese minimum wage laws apply to
the straight wage rate, excluding allowances. We de￿ne hourly wage as (wages for contracted hours ￿
commutationallowance￿perfectattendanceallowance￿familyallowance)/contractedhoursofwork,
5A person in charge of personnel at each establishment is asked to randomly choose a number of workers from the pool
of employees using speci￿c instructions for random sampling, including the sampling probability, which is dependent on
the industry and establishment size. The sample does not include board members, whose wage is set at a general meeting
of shareholders.
6Workers who meet one of the following three criteria are classi￿ed as regular workers: 1. On contracts that do not
clearly specify a contractual time period; 2. On contracts that last more than one month; or 3. On contracts that last less
than one month, but on which the workers worked 18 or more days in the last two months. This classi￿cation includes
part-time workers if one of the above criteria is satis￿ed.
6which is consistent with the minimum-wage law.7 A change in the minimum wage conceivably may
affect the level of allowances. Results obtained in our analysis are unchanged, however, even when
hourly wage is de￿ned as wages (including allowances) for contracted hours divided by contracted
hours of work.
The analysis on how the minimum wage affects employment also includes data from a household
survey that covers non-employed as well as employed individuals. We use the Employment Status
Survey (ESS) for the years 1997 and 2002. The ESS is distributed every 5 years to approximately
440,000 households in sampled units that cover the complete population.8 The survey collects infor-
mation about the number of household members and labor-force status for household members aged
15 and older as of October 1 of each survey year. This study draws on micro data about employment
status, educational attainment, age, sex, and residential area. Overall, the sample includes approxi-
mately 1 million individuals, with a half-million males and a half-million females for each year that
the survey was conducted. The sample is restricted to data with valid age, educational background,
and employment status.
4 Role of the Minimum Wage
4.1 Evolution of the Wage Distribution
The steady increase in the statutory minimum wage occurred in a political process that induces nearly
automatic increases in minimum-wage levels. All prefectural minimum wages rose in the political
climate for the equalization of minimum-wage levels across prefectures, despite serious slumps in
rural areas. The minimum-wage bite indeed became severe in low-wage prefectures in the prolonged
recession. Figures 3A and 3B illustrate the wage distribution in Aomori and Tokyo in 1994 and 2003
for male and female workers with hourly wages between 400 and 3,500 Japanese yen. Aomori, which
is a prefecture located at the north end of Japan’s main island, is classi￿ed as Rank D (with the lowest
minimum wage), while Tokyo is classi￿ed as Rank A (with the highest minimum wage). The wage
7The custom of tipping is not practiced in Japan.
8The sample does not include foreign diplomats, foreign military personnel and their dependents, persons dwelling in
Self Defense Force camps or ships, and persons serving sentences in correctional institutions.
7distribution moved dramatically toward the lower end in Aomori from 1994 to 2003. A moderate
spike emerged around the minimum-wage level in the male wage distribution, while the female wage
distribution was skewed and ￿attened at the minimum-wage level in Aomori. Surprisingly, the wage
density is highest at the minimum-wage level for female workers in 2003. As indicated by the density
of hourly wages below 1,000 Japanese yen, the proportion of low-wage workers also increased for
both males and females in Tokyo, although not to the same extent as in Aomori. The minimum wage
did not seem to bind either male or female workers in Tokyo over the sample period.
Figure 4 plots the minimum wage denominated by the median wage in 1994 and 2003 by pre-
fecture. Tokyo is located in the bottom-left corner, because the real value of its minimum wage was
low for both years. In contrast, Aomori, Akita, Miyazaki, and Okinawa are located in the top-right
corner, because these prefectures had relatively high minimum wages compared to the median wage
for both years. All prefectures experienced an increase in levels of the real minimum wage during
this 10-year period, as evidenced by the fact that all prefectures lie above the 45-degree line. The
vertical distance from the 45-degree line indicates that increases in minimum wages differed across
prefectures in real terms. Variation in the effective minimum wage is exploited to identify how the
minimum wage affected the wage distribution and employment in the subsequent regression analysis.
Figure 5 illustrates the relation between minimum wage and wage compression. The ￿gure plots
the 10th percentile wage relative to the median wage, along with the log of the minimum wage relative
to the median wage by sex. The slope of the ￿tted line is positive in both panels A and B, and it is
greater in panel A for male workers than in panel B for female workers. The plotted points are
located at a higher position in panel B than in panel A, because the distance between the 10th and
50th percentiles of the wage distribution is shorter for female workers than for male workers. The
plotted points are slightly mixed up in panel A, but are separated by year into the upper right and
lower left in Panel B. An increase in the real value of the minimum wage appears to be an important
cause of the compression of the female 10/50 log-wage differential.
84.2 Effect on the Wage Distribution
Increases in the minimum wage can affect the wage distribution through three channels. First, the
wage distribution may be censored by the minimum wage. In this case, the wage distribution spikes
around the minimum wage. Second, a rise in the minimum wage may exert a spillover effect on
workers who earn more than the minimum wage. In a competitive labor market, substitution between
workerswithdifferentskilllevelscanaffectwagespaidtoworkerswhoarenotdirectlyaffectedbythe
minimum wage (Teulings, 2000, 2003). In a monopsonic labor market, spillovers can occur when the
labor-supply curve facing an employer is shifted by increases in the expected wage for unemployed
workers (Manning, 2003). Finally, an increased minimum wage may result in a truncation of the
wage distribution associated with disemployment. The disappearance of the bottom end of the wage
distribution can change the distance between its 10th and 50th percentiles.
We conduct a regression analysis to investigate the cause for wage compression. Our regression
framework is based on Lee (1999).
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the wage distribution, mwit is the minimum wage, dt is a vector of year dummies, di is a vector of pre-
fecture dummies, ti is a vector of prefecture-speci￿c linear time trends, i is the index for prefecture,
and t is the index for year. The minimum-wage bite is measured by the log of the minimum wage
relative to the median wage. Parameter ￿1p represents the percentage change in the pth percentile
wage relative to the median wage caused by a one-percent increase in the effective minimum wage,
if no higher-order term of the effective minimum wage is included. The quadratic term is included
as an additional regressor to capture a nonlinear relation between the minimum wage and wage com-
pression, as illustrated by Lee (1999). Year effects represent the evolution of the wage distribution
over time, the real minimum-wage level being constant. Prefectural ￿xed effects (FE) are added to al-
low for unobserved heterogeneity in the dispersion of the latent wage distribution across prefectures.
Prefecture trends are added to control for macroeconomic trends more ￿exibly.
9See Lee (1999) and Autor, Manning, and Smith (2008) for an explanation of its derivation and justi￿cation.
9Our main interest is in accounting for the reduction in the lower-tail inequality for female workers.
Table 1 lists the results for the 10/50 log-wage differential among female workers. Estimated results
are produced using ordinary least-squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS), and standard
errors are clustered at the prefecture level. The analysis begins with an OLS regression of the 10/50
log-wage differential on year dummies. The estimated year effects represent the unconditional evo-
lution of the wage distribution over time. Column 1 shows the increasing trend of the 10th percentile
wage relative to the median wage. Next, we include the effective minimum wage as an additional
regressor. Column 2 indicates that the coef￿cient for the effective minimum wage is positive and
signi￿cant. R2 rises from 0.07 to 0.56 after the effective minimum wage is added. These results
imply that the minimum-wage bite contributed to the reduction in the distance between the 10th and
50th percentiles of the wage distribution. Moreover, the estimated year effects are virtually zero or
sometimes negative, conditional on the effective minimum wage. These results suggest that wage
compression can be explained entirely by increases in the effective minimum wage over the sample
period.
OLS may suffer from an upward bias associated with measurement errors, however, as Autor,
Manning, and Smith (2008) emphasized. Because the median wage appears on both sides as a de-
nominator, the wage differential is automatically positively correlated with the effective minimum
wage when the median wage is measured with errors. Moreover, a bias can also arise from policy en-
dogeneity. Although the prefectural authorities generally con￿rm the increased amount of minimum-
wage suggested by the central minimum-wage council, the revised value of prefectural minimum
wage is sometimes not exactly the same as that indicated by this council. The direction of the bias is
upward (downward) if a large increase in the minimum wage is permitted by the prefectural authority
that has a small (large) lower-tail inequality. Existing literature tends to ignore policy endogeneity.
Nonetheless, we can address econometric concerns about policy endogeneity, as well as measurement
errors, by using the Japanese minimum-wage system. Speci￿cally, as the instrument for the effective
minimum wage, we use the meyasu minimum wage, which is calculated by the minimum wage in the
previous year plus ￿meyasu￿. The median of the log wage within a prefecture over the sample period
is also used as the instrument, as in Autor, Manning, and Smith (2008). As shown in column 3, the
102SLS estimates are almost identical to the OLS estimates. Given the large sample size of the BSWS
and the Japanese minimum-wage setting, an identical result between the OLS and 2SLS seems quite
natural. Hence, the potential bias resulting from sampling errors or policy endogeneity is negligible
in our analysis.
A key concern is a spurious correlation arising from unobserved heterogeneity in the dispersion
of the latent wage distribution across prefectures. In other words, the important assumption required
to identify the minimum wage effect is no correlation between the effective minimum wage and the
dispersion of the latent wage distribution across prefectures. In the absence of a minimum wage, the
10/50 log-wage differential should be negative and lower in a prefecture with a higher level of wage
dispersion. If the effective minimum wage is positively correlated with the dispersion of the latent
wage distribution, the effect of the minimum wage on the 10/50 log-wage differential will be biased
downward. In contrast, the effect on the 90/50 log-wage differential will be biased upward, because
the sign of the correlation with the wage dispersion is reversed. A standard solution to this problem
is to control for prefecture ￿xed effects. Although the ￿xed-effects approach is generally vulnerable
to measurement errors, the 2SLS results suggest that such a concern is unwarranted here. Column
4 shows that the minimum wage had a greater effect on wage compression when we controlled for
prefecture effects. This result can be interpreted as correcting for omitted-variable bias. Prefecture-
speci￿c linear trends are added to allow for possible changes in the dispersion of the latent wage
distribution. Column 5 shows a slightly larger minimum wage effect. Furthermore, column 6 exhibits
a non-linear relation between minimum wage and wage compression.
One way to assess the validity of our analysis is to examine the effect on upper-tail inequality.
Columns 7￿12 report the results of the 90/50 log-wage differential. Column 7 suggests that the
90/50 log-wage differential was almost stable during the sample period. Column 8 shows a positive
and signi￿cant effect of minimum wage, but R2 increases by only 6 percentage points. The effective
minimum wage does not signi￿cantly explain the 90/50 wage differential. OLS estimates are identical
to 2SLS estimates and similar to ￿xed-effects estimates. Importantly, the effect of the minimum wage
plummets and becomes statistically nonsigni￿cant after controlling for prefecture trends. Column
12 shows that a higher-order term is not signi￿cant, either. Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that the
11minimum wage played a signi￿cant role in compressing the lower tail of the wage distribution, but
did not account for the change in the upper tail of the wage distribution for female workers.
For the sake of completeness, Table A1 lists the results for the 90/50 log-wage differential among
male workers. Column 1 suggests that the 10/50 log-wage differential was almost stable between
1994 and 2000 and started to erode slightly thereafter. Column 2 shows a positive and signi￿cant
effect of minimum wage and R2 rises from 0.06 to 0.38. Coef￿cients for year dummies shrink when
the effective minimum wage is held constant. The results imply that the 10/50 log-wage differen-
tial would have diverged if the real minimum-wage level remained unchanged. 2SLS estimates are
identical to OLS estimates. The effective minimum wage has a stronger effect after controlling for
prefectural ￿xed effects and prefecture-speci￿c linear trends. The minimum wage, however, played
a less signi￿cant role in pushing up the lower tail of the wage distribution for male workers in terms
of the magnitude of estimated coef￿cients and R2. Columns 7￿12 report the results of the 90/50
log-wage differential. Column 7 suggests a slight decline in the male upper-tail inequality during the
sample period. Column 8 shows that, contrary to our expectation, the effective minimum wage had
a positive and signi￿cant effect on the 90/50 log-wage differential and R2 rises from 0.04 to 0.40.
Again, 2SLS estimates are identical to OLS estimates. The minimum wage effect becomes smaller,
but still remains after controlling for prefecture effects and its interaction terms with a linear time
trend. That an increase in the minimum wage would push up the 90th percentile wage is not very
compelling. These results indicate that the effective minimum wage might be higher in prefectures
where the male latent distribution is more dispersed. Thus, the estimate for the effect of the minimum
wage on male lower-tail inequality may be biased downward.
4.3 Minimum Wage Effects or Composition Effects?
In Japan, the labor force has been aging, and job tenure increased for female workers in the period
between 1994 and 2003. In fact, these attributes are key determinants of wages in the Japanese labor
market. Shifts in workforce composition may have mechanically raised or lowered wage inequality.
To isolate the minimum wage effect from the composition effect, we employ the kernel reweighting
approach proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996, hereafter DFL).
12The observed density of log hourly wages in year t is expressed as
f (wj￿ = t) =
Z
g (wjx;￿ = t)h(xj￿ = t)dx; (2)
whereg (wjx;￿ = t)isthedensityofwagesforworkers’observedattributesxinyeart, andh(xj￿ = t)
is the density of attributes x in year t. As shown by DFL, the counterfactual density in year t if the
observed attributes are ￿xed at 1994 levels can be written as
f1994 (wj￿ = t) =
Z
g (wjx;￿ = t)h(xj￿ = 1994)dx (3)
=
Z
g (wjx;￿ = t) t (x)h(xj￿ = t)dx: (4)
where  t (x) = h(xj￿ = 1994)=h(xj￿ = t): Thus, calculating the counterfactual density requires
reweightingapricefunctiong (wjx;￿ = t)bytheratioofthetwocompositefunctionsh(xj￿ = 1994)
and h(xj￿ = t). It is dif￿cult to estimate the composite function, however, because x is high-
dimensional. By applying Bayes’s rule, the reweighting function can be written as







The reweighting function can be estimated using a logit model applied to the pooled data from years
1994 and t. The attributes x include a full set of dummy variables for age and job tenure.10
After reweighting the data in a way that holds the distribution of skills constant over time, we
reexamine Lee’s (1999) model of wage compression. Panel A in Table 2 displays results in selected
columns of Table 1, while panel B in Table 2 shows the results using the counterfactual wage data.
The minimum wage effect decreases slightly, but remains signi￿cant for female lower-tail (10/50)
inequality. The effect on female upper-tail (90/50) inequality becomes smaller and nonsigni￿cant
in column 4 and negative and signi￿cant in column 5. The former suggests that wage compression
can be largely explained by the minimum-wage hike. The latter implies that the expansion of female
upper-tail inequality can be attributed to aging and lengthening job tenure in the labor force. In effect,
10Educational information is not available for part-time workers in BSWS.
13composition effects may be large at the upper tail of the wage distribution, but they cannot account
for most of the reduction in lower-tail inequality.
4.4 Counterfactual Wage Distribution without an Increase in the Effective
Minimum Wage
Increases in the real value of the minimum wage contributed to a compression between the 10th and
50th percentiles of the wage distribution from 1994 to 2003, especially among female workers, as
described thus far. If the effective minimum wage had remained unchanged over the 10-year period,
wage compression might not have occurred. Following Lee (1999), we construct a counterfactual
wage distribution without any increase in the effective minimum wage to quantify the relation be-
tween the minimum wage and wage compression in more detail. The counterfactual wage in 2003
is calculated by subtracting the effect of the 10-year difference in the effective minimum wage from
the actual wage in 2003. Speci￿cally, for a worker k whose hourly wage ranks at pth percentile in














where b ￿1p and b ￿2p are estimated coef￿cients obtained from the regression of the percentile wage
differential on the effective minimum wage, its square, year dummies, prefecture dummies, and
prefecture-speci￿c time trends. The pth percentile varies with prefecture, year, and sex.
Our aim here is to examine the extent to which the minimum-wage bite can explain compres-
sion at the lower tail of the wage distribution. Figure 6 displays the actual and counterfactual wage
distributions for female workers in 1994 and 2003. The lower tail of the actual wage distribution in
2003 is compressed for female workers. The compression is displayed by the spike at the lower tail
of the wage distribution. The difference between the actual and counterfactual distributions in 2003
illustrates the effect of the minimum-wage increase. We ￿nd that the minimum-wage increase pushed
up wages at the lower-tail of the distribution. The lower tail of the counterfactual wage distribution in
2003 overlaps with that of the actual wage distribution in 1994. Thus, the compression of the lower
14tail of the wage distribution can be attributed mostly to the minimum-wage increase.
Figure 7 displays the actual and counterfactual changes in the log hourly wage by percentile
between 1994 and 2003. Lower percentile wages actually increased by 0.02 to 0.08 log points for
female workers between 1993 and 2004, whereas the counterfactual changes without an increase in
the effective minimum wage are close to 0.01 log point from the 10th to 35th wage percentiles. Thus,
the rise in actual lower percentile wages can be largely attributed to the minimum-wage hike. The
difference between the actual and counterfactual wage changes indicates a signi￿cant spillover effect
onworkerswhoearnmorethantheminimumwage. Itmayappearthattheminimumwagecontributed
to widening the upper-tail inequality slightly, but the effects are statistically nonsigni￿cant, as seen in
column 12 of Table 1.
4.5 Part-time Pay Penalty
An increasing trend of hiring part-time workers is a global phenomenon. For example, about 45%
of female workers in Britain work part-time (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). Along with this trend,
the full-time/part-time wage differential has been of interest in recent years. In Japan, the fraction
of part-time workers in the workforce increased from 21.5 to 32.0 percent among female workers
between 1994 and 2003. Indeed, the full-time/part-time wage differential has been a hotly debated
policy issue.
The minimum wage’s effect on wage compression has an implication for the part-time penalty,
i.e., the pay gap between full- and part-time workers. Employees who are paid the minimum wage
are typically part-time workers. Thus, the minimum-wage hike can cause a reduction in the full-
time/part-time wage differential. Some evidence suggests that an increase in the minimum wage may
lower the pay gap between women working full-time and part-time. Manning and Petrongolo (2008)
reported a faster wage growth at the bottom end of the hourly wage distribution for part-time workers
compared to full-time workers after the British national minimum wage was introduced. Abe and
Tanaka (2007) found that having a minimum wage prevented wage erosion among part-time workers
relative to full-time workers in Japan.
We directly quantify how the minimum wage affected the pay gap between full- and part-time
15workers using the counterfactual wage distribution without an increase in the effective minimum
wage. The analysis focuses on female workers, because the proportion of male part-time workers
was very small.11 Table 3 reports the actual and counterfactual pay gaps between full- and part-time
workers. The actual pay gap was 36.2 percent in 1994 and increased to 38.2 percent in 2003. The pay
gap would have been 39.1 percent in 2003, however, if the minimum wage had remained at the 1994
level. These results imply that the minimum wage contributed to the reduction in the full-time/part-
time wage differential by 1 percentage point at the mean.
Figure 8 illustrates the full-time/part-time log-wage differential by wage percentile. The pay gap
between full- and part-time workers increases from the lower to the upper tail of the wage distribution.
The actual pay gap did not change below the 30th percentile between 1994 and 2003. The pay gap
would have expanded, however, if no increase in the minimum wage had occurred. The minimum
wage had a greater effect at the lower tail of the wage distribution. The pay gap without the minimum-
wage increase, for example, would have expanded by about 5 percentage points at the 25th percentile.
5 Wage Compression or Employment Loss?
5.1 Effect on Employment
The minimum wage provided a ￿wage ￿oor￿ during the period of de￿ation, as seen above. This
brings up the question of how the wage ￿oor affected employment during the corresponding period.
The effect of a minimum wage on employment is still vigorously debated, but both sides of the debate
seem to agree that labor-market friction determines whether a minimum wage has an adverse effect
on employment among low-skilled workers (Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2008).
A few recent studies in Japan have investigated the disemployment effect (Kawaguchi and Yamada,
2006; Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2007; Abe and Tamada, 2008; Kawaguchi and Mori, 2009) but no
consensus has been reached, and the cross-sectional analyses conducted by Tachibanaki and Urakawa
(2007) and Abe and Tamada (2008) controlled for neither prefecture nor year effects.
To examine how the minimum wage affected employment, we conduct a standard pseudo-panel
11The fraction of part-time male workers was 1.8 percent in 1994 and 4.0 percent in 2003.
16data analysis, as put forth by Neumark and Wascher (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995), among






= ￿jg mwit + dt￿j + di￿j + ujit; (7)
where emp is the number of employed individuals, and pop is population size. Again, the effective
minimum wage is measured by the log of the minimum wage relative to the median wage.12 Para-
meter ￿ represents the wage elasticity of labor demand for minimum-wage workers. If parameter
￿j is negative, an increase in the minimum wage reduces the employment rate for group j. A com-
mon macroeconomic shock is ￿exibly captured by year dummies. The results obtained in this paper
change only marginally, when the employment rate for male college graduates aged between 31 and
59 is included as an additional regressor to enable further control of aggregate ￿uctuations in employ-
ment. Prefecture dummies are included to allow for an unobserved prefecture effect. In light of Card
and Krueger’s (1995) criticism, we do not include the college enrollment rate as a regressor. Thus,
regressors include only exogenous variables in our preferred speci￿cation of labor demand.
The employment rate is calculated from ESS data; these surveys were conducted only in years
1997 and 2002 during the sample period of 1994￿2003. The effective minimum wage is calculated
from the BSWS, as in the previous analysis.
Our analysis focuses on low-skilled workers who had completed high school or less. This low-
skilled group tends to be most affected by increases in the minimum wage. Typical low-wage workers
are young or middle-aged women with part-time jobs. The model is estimated using the ￿xed-effects
approach. Table 4 reports how the minimum wage affected female employment by age group.13
The estimated year effect is negative for all age groups, indicating a decline in the labor-market
attachment. The minimum wage effect is negative but nonsigni￿cant, except for females aged 31￿
59 years. However, column 3 reveals a moderate and signi￿cant disemployment effect for females
12The time trend in our measure of the effective minimum wage is similar to the Kaitz index.
13When the number of hours of work was used as a dependent variable instead of the employment rate, the estimated
minimum-wage effects were generally statistically nonsigni￿cant for all demographic groups after controlling for prefec-
tural ￿xed effects. These results are not surprising, because decreasing the number of employees can reduce ￿rms’ labor
costs more effectively than reducing the number of hours of work when ￿xed costs arise in employment. Most previous
studies have focused on the effect on employment.
17aged 31￿59 years. This result seems plausible, given the high proportion of part-time workers and
the fact that the minimum-wage bite is considerable for this demographic group. For the sake of
completeness, Table A2 reports the results of the disemployment effect by age group among male
workers. The disemployment effect is not statistically signi￿cant for any age group.
5.2 Effect on New Hires
Costs of employment adjustment are asymmetric between hiring and ￿ring. Hiring is less costly
than ￿ring because employment regulations levy high ￿ring costs on ￿rms.14 Estimated employment
elasticity is imprecise but greatest for those aged 22 or younger, as shown in column 1 of Tables
4 and A2. Given the costs incurred by ￿ring, including legal costs and sunk costs for training, the
disemployment effect is presumably pronounced at the margin of new hires. Nonetheless, very few
studies to date, with the exception of Portugal and Cardoso (2006), have explored the effect on worker
￿ow.
We examine how the minimum-wage hike affected the number of new hires conditional on the
number of regular workers, similar to the pseudo-panel data analysis of net employment. The number
of new graduates (from schools, colleges, and universities) hired by each ￿rm is available from the









g mwit + dtb ￿ + dib ￿ + tib ￿ + b uit; R
2 = 0:91;
where newhire is thenumber ofnew graduates hired, employee is thenumber ofregular workers, and
the last four terms are prefecture dummies, year dummies, prefecture-speci￿c linear time trends, and
the residual, respectively. The model is estimated using the ￿xed-effects approach. The hat represents
the estimate. A total of 470 observations are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the prefecture level.
As shown above, a one-percent increase in the effective minimum wage leads to a 1.82-percentage
decrease in the ratio of new graduates hired among female employees. For male new graduates,
14In most cases, Japanese employment regulations were not put into statutory form, but were established by court
precedents (Sugeno 2002). The ￿abuse of dismissal rights￿ doctrine, however, was legislated in Article 16 of the Labor
Contract Act in 2008.
18however, the effect on new hires is statistically nonsigni￿cant and smaller than that for female new
graduates. The estimated coef￿cient on the effective minimum wage is ￿0.31 with a standard error
of 0.81, and R2 is 0.84. If the interpretation can be extended to other demographic groups, the
minimum-wage hike is also considered to have reduced new hires among middle-aged female (part-
time) workers.
5.3 Removing the Truncation Effect
Up to this point, the results have con￿rmed that an increase in the effective minimum wage com-
pressed the lower tail of the wage distribution but reduced employment for low-skilled female work-
ers. We are now concerned about a mechanism of wage compression. Our analysis suggests that
the minimum-wage hike caused employment loss among low-skilled female workers. The lower tail
of the wage distribution might be mechanically compressed by the truncation of the bottom end of
the wage distribution associated with disemployment. Indeed, the distance between the 10th and 50th
percentilesofthewagedistributionshouldmechanicallyshrinkafterthewagedistributionistruncated
at the minimum wage.15 Thus, we investigate to what extent wage compression can be explained by
employment loss resulting from the minimum-wage increase.
The problem can be described as a sample selection problem. The observed density of log hourly
wages conditional on the effective minimum wage g mw and workers’ observed attributes x can be
written as f (wtj g mwt;xt) in year t, while the counterfactual density if the effective minimum wage
hadremainedatthe1994level canbeexpressedasf (wtj g mw1994;xt). Theactual wagedensitycanbe
in￿uenced by the truncation of the wage distribution caused by the minimum-wage increase between
1994 and 2003, whereas the counterfactual density cannot. Let et denote an indicator variable for
being employed. The following assumptions are required to quantify the truncation effect.
Assumptions. (a) The minimum wage has neither a spillover effect nor a censoring effect, i.e.,
g (wtjet = 1; g mwt;xt) = g (wtjet = 1; g mw1994;xt); (b) The minimum wage has no direct effect on
15An arbitrary continuous distribution requires that
R !
50
!10 f (!)d! = 0:4, where ! is the log hourly wage, !10 and !50
are the 10th and 50th percentiles of the log wage distribution and f (￿) is the probability density function. The distribution
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19the distribution of individual attributes, i.e., h(xtj g mwt) = h(xtj g mw1994).
Under the two assumptions, the minimum wage affects the wage distribution solely through the
disemployment effect. These assumptions are extreme, but suitable for our purpose, which is to
examine the extent to which truncation can explain the compression of lower-tail inequality. As
derived in the Appendix, the counterfactual density can be nonparametrically constructed as follows:
f (wtjet = 1; g mw1994) =
Z
g (wtjet = 1; g mwt;xt)￿(g mw1994; g mwt;xt)h(xtjet = 1; g mwt)dx;
(8)
where
￿(g mw1994; g mwt;xt) =
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994;xt)
Pr(et = 1j g mwt;xt)
￿
Pr(et = 1j g mwt)
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994)
:
The weighting function is essentially the ratio of the employment rate at the 1994 minimum-wage
level to the employment rate at the current minimum-wage level. The weighting procedure is quite
intuitive. To remove the truncation effect on the wage distribution, more weight is given to workers
who would have a higher propensity to be employed without an increase in the effective minimum
wage, i.e., to those who are more likely to disappear from the labor market because of the minimum-
wage hike. An estimate of the response probability can be obtained from a probit model:
Pr(ekt = 1j g mwit;xjt) = ￿
￿
￿j0 + ￿j1g mwit + di￿j + ￿jt
￿
: (9)
where di is a vector of prefecture dummies, t is a linear time trend, k is an index for individual, j is an
index for worker’s attributes x. Speci￿cally, workers are classi￿ed into four age groups (￿22, 23-30,
31-59, ￿60). All parameters are allowed to vary with group j. The model is estimated using the
individual-level micro data from the ESS. Minimum-wage effects are negative and statistically sig-
ni￿cant for all age groups. The estimated coef￿cients ￿j1 (standard errors clustered at the prefecture
level) are, in order of age, -0.133 (0.210), -0.127 (0.124), -0.283 (0.111), -0.115 (0.110). Using the
regression coef￿cients, we can calculate the weight for every year over the sample period by virtue
of linear time trends, although the ESS was collected only in years 1997 and 2002 during the sample
period of 1994￿2003. Higher-order terms of time trends cannot be identi￿ed from two-period data.
We omit an illustration of the counterfactual distribution in the absence of the disemployment
20effect, because it almost fully overlaps with the actual distribution. Panel C in Table 2 shows the
results that are reproduced using counterfactual data. Results are identical to those using the actual
sample. Therefore, the truncation effect is negligible in our analysis of wage compression.
5.4 Upper Bound of the Truncation Effect
Employment loss may occur exclusively from the bottom end of the wage distribution for each skill
group. In that case, our proposed method could underestimate the truncation effect. Thus, we al-
ternatively propose a more conservative approach. Our idea is to add workers who are unemployed
because of the minimum-wage increase at the lower end of the distribution. The alternative method
is developed to quantify the upper bound of the mechanical effect.
The standard pseudo-panel model of employment implies that the change in the log employ-






= b ￿j￿g mwit; where b ￿j is the estimated coef￿cient for the effective minimum wage in
the ￿xed-effect estimates of the employment equation for group j. Assuming that the population size
is unchanged, the decrease in the number of employed can be expressed as
￿empjit = b ￿j￿g mwit ￿ empjit: (10)
The counterfactual wage distribution for group j in prefecture i in year t can be constructed in the
following steps.
1. Substituting the actual change in the effective minimum wage yields the number of workers
who lost their jobs by group and prefecture between years t ￿ 1 and t. Then, calculate the total





it workers into the lowest end of the wage distribution yields the counterfactual
wage distribution in the absence of disemployment. The counterfactual wage distribution is
produced by the wage data on Nit + Nadd
it workers, where zero log wage is assigned to Nadd
it
unemployed workers.
21The counterfactual scenario considered here is that workers who are laid off because of the
minimum-wage increase could stay in the lowest-wage job. In the ￿rst step, we lose observations
from the ￿rst year of the sample period in creating the counterfactual sample. In the second step, a
value of zero is imputed to the log hourly wage for unemployed individuals to add them from the
bottom end of the distribution. This imputation procedure is extreme but suitable for our purpose to
remove the upper-bound truncation effect.
The results of the 10/50 log-wage differential in Table 1 are reproduced for the counterfactual
sample in panel D of Table 2. Estimation results differ only marginally. Eliminating the upper bound
of the truncation effect, our analysis provides the lower bound of the censoring and spillover effects.
Indeed, the lower-bound estimates are smaller than baseline estimates, but the difference is minimal.
The results suggest that a change in the effective minimum wage affects the wage distribution mostly
through censoring and spillover. An alternative imputation procedure will not change the results if all
imputed wages are lower than the 10th percentile wage. If some imputed wages are greater than 10th
percentile wage, the truncation effect will be even smaller and the censoring and spillover effects will
be larger.
6 Conclusions
This study has examined how the minimum wage affected the wage distribution between 1994 and
2003 in Japan, the world’s second-largest economy. Japan’s experience since the 1990s mirrors the
U.S. experience in the 1980s and 1990s. The real value of the minimum wage substantially increased
because of a fall in the median wage in a de￿ationary economy and because of a steady increase in
the statutory minimum wage. As a consequence, the minimum-wage hike compressed the lower tail
of the wage distribution in Japan, whereas a fall in the effective minimum wage resulted in increased
wage inequality in the United States.
Our analysis revealed that the minimum wage had a signi￿cant effect on wage compression for
female workers. The decline in the 10/50 wage differential among female workers between 1994 and
2003 was largely explained by the increase in the minimum wage relative to the median wage. These
results held even after controlling for composition effects. Without this increase in the effective
22minimum wage, only small increases in hourly wages in the lower half of the distribution would
have occurred for female workers. We also found that the increase in the effective minimum wage
decreased the full-time/part-time wage differential by 5 percentage points at the lower tail of the wage
distribution among female workers. The minimum-wage hike reduced employment for low-skilled,
middle-aged female workers. The disemployment effect was ￿0.31 in elasticity terms. We obtained
similarresultsforwagecompression, however, afterrecoveringthewagedistributionintheabsenceof
disemployment. The reduction in the lower-tail inequality from female workers cannot be attributed
to the effect of truncation.
To conclude, the minimum wage provided a wage ￿oor for female workers in Japan’s de￿ationary
economy. However, this bene￿t of the minimum-wage system came at the cost of moderate employ-
ment loss among low-skilled, middle-aged female workers. The ￿ndings imply a policy trade-off
between the reduction in wage inequality and disemployment of workers who are weakly attached to
the labor market.
Some issues remain for future research. First, it would be helpful to address the issue of employ-
ment in more detail by using unique data about job ￿ow at the establishment level. Data from the
Survey on Employment Trends (Koyou Doukou Chousa) could be used to analyze how the minimum
wage affects worker ￿ow for each skill group across industries. Second, the minimum-wage hike
may affect college enrollment and occupational choices. Constructing a model of educational and oc-
cupational choices would be helpful to examine how the minimum wage affects complex individual
choices.
23Appendix
Derivation of equation (8).
The counterfactual wage density is
f (wtjet = 1; g mw1994) =
Z
g (wtjet = 1; g mw1994;xt)h(xtjet = 1; g mw1994)dx (11)
whereg (wtjet = 1; g mw1994;xt)istheconditionaldensityofhourlywages, andh(xtjet = 1; g mw1994)
is the conditional density of workers’ attributes.
The ￿rst assumption states that the conditional wage density can be written as
g (wtjet = 1; g mw1994;xt) = g (wtjet = 1; g mwt;xt): (12)
The second assumption implies that the conditional density of workers’ attributes can be written as
h(xtjet = 1; g mw1994) =
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994;xt)h(xtj g mw1994)
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994)
=
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994;xt)h(xtj g mwt)
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994)
: (13)
By applying Bayes’s rule,
h(xtjet = 1; g mwt) =
h(xt;et = 1j g mwt)
Pr(et = 1j g mwt)
=
Pr(et = 1j g mwt;xt)h(xtj g mwt)
Pr(et = 1j g mwt)
h(xtj g mwt) =
Pr(et = 1j g mwt)
Pr(et = 1j g mwt;xt)
￿ h(xtjet = 1; g mwt): (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) yields
h(xtjet = 1; g mw1994) = ￿(g mw1994; g mwt;xt)h(xtjet = 1; g mwt): (15)
24where
￿(g mw1994; g mwt;xt) =
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994;xt)
Pr(et = 1j g mwt;xt)
￿
Pr(et = 1j g mwt)
Pr(et = 1j g mw1994)
:
After collecting the conditional wage density (12) and the conditional density of workers’ attributes
(15), the counterfactual wage density (11) can be written as
f (wtjet = 1; g mw1994) =
Z
g (wtjet = 1; g mwt;xt)￿(g mw1994; g mwt;xt)h(xtjet = 1; g mwt)dx:
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Table 1: How the minimum wage affected the wage distribution. 
Sample: Females, 1994–2003 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Estimation  Methods  OLS OLS 2SLS  FE  FE  FE  OLS OLS 2SLS  FE  FE  FE 
Dependent Variables  10/50 log Wage Differential  90/50 log Wage Differential 
ln(MW/W50)   –  0.39 0.38 0.54 0.61 1.34  –  0.21 0.21 0.27 0.11 0.62 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.38) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.73)
[ln(MW/W50)]
2 
– – – – –  0.77  – – – – –  0.53 
  (0.39) (0.74)
Year 1995  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year 1996  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 1997  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 1998  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 1999  0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.01  0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 2000  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01  0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 2001  0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03  0.03 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 2002  0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.04  0.04 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year 2003  0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.04  0.04 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant  -0.35  -0.14  -0.15  -0.06 0.56 -0.70 0.60 0.71 0.71 0.74  13.94  13.07 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.21) (0.69) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.39) (1.34)
Prefecture trends  No No No No Yes  Yes  No No No No Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.07 0.56  –  0.55 0.79 0.80 0.03 0.09  –  0.18 0.54 0.54 
Notes: A total of 470 observations are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the prefecture level. 
MW and W50 represent minimum wage and median wage, respectively. The base year is 1994. Instrumental 
variables are the meyasu minimum wage and the median of the log wage within a prefecture over the sample 
period. The first-stage F-statistic is 26,143. 
 





Table 2: Controlling for changes in workforce composition and the disemployment effect. 
Sample: Females, high school education or less, 1997 and 2002 
   (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation  Methods  OLS FE  FE OLS FE  FE 
Dependent Variables  10/50 log Wage Differential 90/50 log Wage Differential
  Panel A: Baseline 
  0.39 0.54 0.61 0.21 0.27 0.11 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
  Panel B: No Change in Workforce Composition 
ln(MW/W50)   0.32 0.41 0.56 0.16 -0.15 0.23 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) 
  Panel C: No Truncation Effect 
  0.39 0.54 0.61 0.21 0.28 0.13 
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) 
  Panel D: No Employment Loss 
  0.40 0.56 0.59 0.18 0.25 0.10 
   (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
Prefecture trends  No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: A total of 470 observations are included in Panels A to C, and a total of 423 observations are included in 
Panel D. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the prefecture level. MW and W50 represent minimum 
wage and median wage, respectively. Other covariates include year dummies. 






Table 3: Actual and counterfactual pay gaps between full-time and part-time female workers. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample  1994 Actual  2003 Actual  2003 Counterfactual 
   Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time  Part-time
log Wage  7.053 6.691 7.141 6.759 7.115 6.723 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log Wage Differentials  0.362 0.382 0.391 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations  384801 105210 283943 133475 283943 133475 
      [21.5%]    [32.0%]    [32.0%] 









Table 4: How the minimum wage affected the employment rate. 
Dependent variable: log employment rate 
Sample: Females, High school education or less, 1997 and 2002 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation Methods FE 
Age Groups  ≤22 23–30  31–59 ≥60 
ln(MW/W50)  -0.768 -0.367 -0.313 -0.373 
(0.569) (0.315) (0.169) (0.489) 
Year 2002  -0.044 0.033 -0.017 -0.099 
  (0.032) (0.018) (0.010) (0.028) 
R
2  0.582 0.120 0.716 0.786 
Notes: A total of 94 observations are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the prefecture 
level. MW and W50 represent minimum wage and median wage, respectively. The base year is 1997. 
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Figure 2: Nominal and real minimum wages. 
 
Notes: Minimum wages are weighted averages of regional minimum wages. The weight is the number of 
workers in the BSWS. The real minimum wage is calculated by dividing the nominal minimum wage by the 
consumer price index (CPI). The CPI is adjusted according to the results of Broda and Weinstein (2007) that the 
average rate of deflation was 1.2 percent per year between 1998 and 2006 when the substitution bias and quality 
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Table A1: How the minimum wage affected the wage distribution. 
Sample: Males, 1994–2003 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Estimation  Methods  OLS OLS 2SLS FE  FE  FE  OLS OLS 2SLS  FE  FE  FE 
Dependent Variables  10/50 log Wage Differential  90/50 log Wage Differential 
ln(MW/W50)   –  0.29 0.28 0.49 0.50 0.70  –  0.42 0.42 0.32 0.27 0.31 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.31)  (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.82) 
[ln(MW/W50)]
2 
– – – – –  0.10 
(0.15) 
– – – – –  0.02 
(0.40)   
Year 1995  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 1996  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 1997  0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 1998  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 1999  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2000  -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2001  -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2002  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2003  -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  -0.51  -0.20  -0.21 0.01 -0.96 0.12 0.62 1.06 1.07 0.96 7.10 7.11 
  (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.18) (0.17) (0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.19) (0.23) 
Prefecture trends  No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No 
R
2  0.06 0.38  –  0.52 0.68 0.53 0.04 0.40  –  0.40 0.64 0.64 
Notes: A total of 470 observations are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the prefecture 
level. MW and W50 represent minimum wage and median wage, respectively. The base year is 1994. 
Instrumental variables are the meyasu minimum wage and the median of the log wage within a prefecture over 
the sample period. The first-stage F-statistic is 170,000. 





Table A2: How the minimum wage affected the employment rate. 
Dependent variable: log employment rate 
Sample: Males, High school education or less, 1997 and 2002 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation Methods FE 
Age Groups  ≤22 23–30  31–59 ≥60 
ln(MW/W50)  -0.428 0.072 -0.067 -0.251 
(0.460) (0.162) (0.086) (0.377) 
Year 2002  -0.059 -0.057 -0.036 -0.112 
  (0.029) (0.010) (0.005) (0.024) 
R
2  0.650 0.853 0.922 0.861 
Notes: A total of 94 observations are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
prefecture level. MW and W50 represent minimum wage and median wage, respectively. The base year 
is 1997. 